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tEije Himbabtaje Hato Hebtetas 
tfi no longer a tfjtng of tfyt paat! ;■
You may have been starting to think that the Zimbabwe Law 
Review had become redundant., One unkind person went as far 
as to suggest that we should rename our journai "fE^ e $i*toritaI Halo 
iU b te tf '!
Unfortunately we had fallen a few years behind in the production 
of the Review. The last issue to appear previously was Volume 7 
/ 8 covering the years 1989 and 1990. The Editorial Board of the 
Review sincerely apologises to all of valued subscribers and 
buyers of the Review for the inconvenience caused to them. In 
order to speed up the process of getting up to date we decided 
to combine Volumes 9/10 (1991 and 1992) of the Review into a 
single number. Those who have subscribed in advance will be 
receiving their ordered issues within the near future. The next 
volume, Number 11 (1993), will be ready for distribution within 
the next few months. The Editorial Board would like to assure 
you that in the future the Law Review will be produced on a more 
regular basis.
We hope that you will renew your interest in this publication by 
renewing your subscriptions if you have allowed them to lapse. 
Details of current subscription rates are to be found on the cover 
of the Review. There is a reduced price for those ordering a set 
of the Zimbabwe Law Review.
We would like to call for the submission of articles, book reviews 
and casenotes for consideration for inclusion in this publication. 
These are momentous times for Southern Africa. Democratic rule 
has finally come to South Africa after so many years of struggle, 
suffering and oppression. We would like to take this opportunity 
to extend our heartfelt congratulations to the people of South 
Africa on the attainment of their liberation from apartheid rule.
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So too, academ ic freedom  Is w hat i t  is. It is mot general .liberty, p leasant 
working conditions, equality, se lf realisation , or happ iness.1
In troduction
To contemporary African politics, academic freedom is at best irrelevant and, at 
worst, conjures up images of political opposition. This explains the fate of many 
African universities and academics. Current Western jurisprudence has done no 
better. Academic freedom is consistently ascribed to certain political systems or 
cultures. Under this utilitarian calculus, academic freedom can be regulated 
according to the interests of politics or the market. This is the point of departure in 
this article. It suggests that the current understanding of academic freedom, which 
finds academic freedom a servant of politics and economics (both from the rightist 
and leftist perspective) is nothing bu t the variegation of error. If this is true, how 
therefore can we understand academic freedom, and what underlies its philosophi­
cal foundation? The alternative framework I advance suggests the proper under­
standing of academic freedom lies in its grasp as an idea of public reason, so to speak. 
This indeed, is th e  theory of academic freedom.
The argum ent is a t three levels. First, while the practice of academic freedom can be 
examined from a historical or sociological perspective, the concept of academic 
freedom is ahistorical; it is a universal idea inherent in hum an reason. The political 
instantiation of academic freedom only affects the way the right is practised. As an 
idea of reason, academic freedom finds practical vindication in the university, an 
institution which presents itself as the exemplar of public reason. Secondly, the 
liberal conception of academic freedom comes closest to realisation of the concept. 
Thirdly, utilitarian considerations cannot provide a normative foundation for 
academic freedom, even though they buttress the metaphysical underpinnings of 
academic freedom.
The formal nature of the discussion makes it easier to judge whether academic 
freedom exists and if it does, whether it is worthy of legal sanction as a right. I begin 
by explaining the theoretical underpinnings that underlie the liberal conception of 
academic freedom rather than with a definition of the idea itself. A substantive 
definition of academic freedom at this stage would require us to impose theory on 
reality. Truth is a  complex m atter and to define it now would unduly limit the inquiry.
Graduate student and registered legal practitioner, Zimbabwe.
Mark G Yudof, “Intramural Musings on Academic Freedom: A Reply to Professor 
Finkin,” (1988) 66 Texas Law Review 1351, at p 1357.
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A definition perse  does not solve fundamental issues, as its merit depends upon the 
theory in which it is embedded. “Analyses of meaning therefore have no privileged 
sta tus but m ust be assessed as elements of a larger theoretical enterprise.”2
The liberal conception of academic freedom has taken from politics the fundamental 
values of free speech, free press and the right to hold an opinion. From commerce, 
it has borrowed the analogy of a  free market of ideas. From science and philosophy 
it has taken the notion of an ongoing search for truth, fostered by free inquiry and 
authenticated by objective processes and judged by the proficient.
Freedom  of Expression and Opinion
There are four justifications that are commonly said to underlie freedom of 
expression. These values also find particular application to academic freedom.
A. Freedom of expression serves tru th  by creating a marketplace of ideas.
This idea has found judicial expression in Justice Holmes’s famous d issen t 
in Abrams v United States3. Holmes J  opined that “the best test for tru th  is the 
power of thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the m arket.”
B. Freedom of expression protects democracy. This view is championed by Alex­
ander Meiklejohn, especially in his book Political Freedom: The C o n s  t i t u -  
tional Power o f the People, (1960) where he argues that the critical issue for free 
speech is not that everyone should speak bu t rather that everything worth 
saying shall be said.4
C. Freedom of expression m aintains social stability. This view is articulated by 
Thomas Emerson, in The System  Of Freedom Of Expression, p7 (1970). 
Emerson argues that free expression ensures social coherence because people 
are likely to accept adverse decisions if they were part of the decision making 
process. If people are not free to express themselves they are likely to go 
underground.
D. Freedom of expression promotes self fulfilment, which encourages self govem- 
m ent/autonom y and identity. This is the opposite of a politically imposed 
orthodox way of life. Governments should not dictate ideas; people should be 
to left decide for themselves what they want to know within the confines of 
reason. The political justification is that provided by Mill, i.e. that it protects 





John Rawls, A Theory of Justice^  130 (1971). See also Kenneth I Winston, “The 
Ideal Element in the Definition of Law,” (1985) 5 Law and Philosophy 89, “Rather 
the definition serves as a proxy for the deeper issues at stake ... a good definition is 
one that organises the subject matter in such a way that help us grasp more clearly 
the fundamental patterns in our fields of study.” J
250 U.S. 616, at p 630 (1919).
The same can be said with academic freedom; the idea is not that everything is 
studied, but that everything meriting study is studied.
John Stuart Mill, On LibertyA (Gertrude Himmelfarb, ed, 1974). I discuss Mill’s idea
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From the above justifications we crystallise the following principle: Expression which 
serves all the above principles has priority over expression which serves few or none 
of the above principles. A central argument in this paper is that academic freedom 
which satisfies all the above principles in fact transcends them. The free expression 
principle indicates that academic freedom can manifest itself as the paradigm  of 
free speech. The case for academic freedom, of all the manifestations of free speech, 
is the strongest. The further one moves away from the principle of academic freedom 
the nearer one gets to principles that are alien to free speech.
The M arketplace of Ideas
The discussion here centres on the marketplace of ideas in so far as it relates to the 
idea of academic freedom. The market for tru th  consists of “trade” i.e. competition 
in ideas on philosophy, politics, humanities, social sciences, natural and physical 
sciences, art; in short all branches of hum an knowledge.6 The idea of the free market 
of ideas has its fair share of critics. It has been argued tha t it is based on laissezfaire 
economic theory. But laissezJaire economic theory is contradicted by the modem 
market which is heavily regulated by the state. Moreover the real market favours the 
elites and is sometimes riddled with monopolies.7 Smolla, argues that if tru th  is the 
aim of the academic market, then such a market is contradicted by our everyday 
experiences which make the persistence of “falsehoods” difficult to explain. Racial 
bigotry, irrational appeals to hate and prejudice, and attendant violence, continue 
to plague the world. He further argues that we can never empirically test the claim 
that tru th  generally trium phs over error, because this requires an objective measure 
of tru th .8
Byrne, argues that certain groups have benefited from the weaknesses of the free 
market of ideas. These groups have harnessed and m anipulated the tools of modern 
m ass communication to perpetuate false doctrines.9 In sum m ation these arguments 
hold the marketplace of ideas a false or poor metaphorical allegory for academic 
freedom. For one, it reinforces the notion that the university arid its activities should 
conform to and be judged according to market criteria. No doubt such notions 
encourage extraneous attem pts to corrupt the spirit of academic freedom.10
Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canadax p 713 (1985).
John M Scanlan “Aliens in the Marketplace of Ideas: The Government, The Acad­
emy and the McCarran-Walter Act,” (1988) 66 Texas Law Review p 1524 .
Rodney Smolla, “Academic Freedom, Hate Speech and the Idea of a University,” 53 
Communications of Ideas and the Quest for Truth: Towards a Teleological Approach 
to First Amendment Adjudication,” (1971) 41 George Washington Law Review pp 
90-191.
Peter Byrne, “Academic Freedom: A “Special Concern of the First Amendment,” 
(1989) 99 Yale Law Journal 251, at p 261.
Antony O’Hear, “Academic Freedom and the University,” in Academic Freedom And 
Responsibility, p 16 (Malcolm Tight, ed., 1988). In the United Kingdom attempts to 
run universities on a commercial level proved unworkable. Universities had been re­
quired to bid for money from the government in relation to the teaching of a prede­
termined number of students in a specified field. The idea was that universities 
would outbid each other and lower costs of education per student because of 
economies of scale. See “Universities For Sale?,” and “University Funding Plan Col­
lapses in Chaos,” in 1990 Nature pp 3-4.
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For several reasons these arguments are misplaced, a t least in so far as they relate 
to the university. At a theoretical level, the inadequate comprehension of the 
workings of the market place of ideas, stems ftom the failure to distinguish concept 
from conception.11 *As an ideal, the concept of a free market of ideas is not based on 
empirical observation like trade in goods. It is a construct of reason that accords with 
the idea of the university. Accordingly, it should not be confused with the ordinary 
market. The latter has its logic in profit, while the former is tied to the notion of truth. 
At the perceptive level, one can, for example, make a fundamental distinction 
between wheat trading in the market and a polemic between professors about what 
constitutes wrongful gain in wheat trading. There is thus a categorical distinction 
between commodities trading and the free exchange of ideas. The scepticism of the 
market place of ideas is healthy in that ideas are subjected to scrutiny and rigorous 
debate before gaining acceptance. The claim is that tru th  stands a better chance not 
only by the competition bu t also by allowing it to resolve itself organically, i. e. without 
external intervention.
This, in essence underlies Mill’s claim that truth, unlike error, never dies and that 
freedom is the condition precedent to all inquiry. Without competition in ideas, tru th  
would degenerate into dogma.13 The dialectic of tru th  and refutation arises because 
of the uncertainty and fallibility of the hum an mind, i.e. most beliefs cannot be said 
to be true or false. The underlying rationale of Mill’s argum ent is that an opinion that 
has been silenced might have very well been true; and even if the opinion was 
erroneous, it may have contained some valuable elements of truth. The tru th  of 
statem ents m ust be tested by vigorous debate otherwise their validity of statem ents 
is a t risk of being perceived as prejudice. Our tolerance of the existence of bigoted 
falsity and evil may be necessary for us to understand the good. In the long run  
censorship is futile because of hum an nature itself. Truth, even when suppressed, 
never dies, for new generations will always discover it.14
Schauer, argues tha t this aspect of Mill’s argument is weak when applied to society 
in general. Society has a t times been seduced by appeals to irrational prejudices. 
There have been circumstances when opinions have been suppressed, precisely 
because they are true or thought to cause undesirable consequences unrelated to
The distinction between concept and conceptions forms part of the Rawlsian enter­
prise. A concept is ahistorical, while conceptions are influenced by factors like his­
tory, politics, economics, sociology and one’s contingent circumstances. See John 
Rawls, A Theory of Justicex pp 5-6; Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, pp 
134-136 (1977). We deal with academic freedom the same way. The purpose of 
theory is to discover the concept and justify it. While the concept of academic free­
dom exists outside of history, a historical exposition can demonstrate the extent to 
which the ideal has been observed under different political circumstances.
Mill, On Liberty, pp 97-99; Keyishian v Board of Regents 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
Mill, On Liberty, pp 115-116.
Consider, for example, the existence of racist groups in society. The argument is not 
that we should always maintain an adequate supply of racists in society. Rather 
what matters is our willingness to tolera te them and to try and understand racism 
and its attendant evils. To suppress them would drive them underground which is 
ultimately more dangerous. It is not the good that matters, rather it is the evil that 
is avoided.
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the truth or falsity of the suppressed opinions. Schauer concludes , and correctly so, 
that the argument for the power of tru th  is best suited to institutions dedicated to 
the veiy purpose of rational thinking and the pursuit of tru th  as an end in itself.15
The P ursu it of T ru th
The pursuit of tru th  is an end in itself, and as a pre-eminent value it is above all other 
interests in the university. The end we are concerned with is not sensual satisfaction 
but rather the Aristotlean formula tion of knowledge as the maximal development of 
the intellect, i.e. the “potential tha t distinguishes m an qua m an from all other 
creatures.”16 In On Liberty, Mill ponders on the question why the majority of 
humankind, (given the right circumstances) is amenable to rational opinions and 
conduct. The answer lies in the quality of the hum an mind, which makes a person 
as a moral or intellectual being, capable of recognising that errors are correctable by 
discussion and experience.17 Marcuse like Mill believes tha t the telos (end) of 
tolerance is truth. Tolerance of free speech is the way of improvement, of progress 
in liberation, ... because there is an objective tru th  which can be discovered, 
ascertained only in learning and comprehending that which is and that which can 
be and ought to be done for the sake of improving the lot of m ankind.18 The quest for 
tru th  in universities has rendered incalculable benefit to society, but the magnitude 
of this service is rarely sufficiently appreciated by society in general.19
U tilitarian  and Political Ju s tifica tio n s  of th e  U niversity
It is a truism  that politics, politicians and society in general are loathe to accept 
anything that cannot be justified in utilitarian terms. The public good justification 
of the university would appear to be that the university and academic freedom are 
essential to the legitimacy of the political process and to answer the needs of society.20 
In one of the greatest tracts on political democracy,21 Hobbes offers a spirited political 
justification of the university. For him universities are;
The Fountains of Civill and Morall Doctrine, From whence The Preachers and Gentry, 
drawing such water as they may find, use to sprinkle thesame.. upon the People, there 
ought certainly to be the greatest care taken, to have it pure, both from the Vermin Of 
Heathen Politicians, and from the Incarnations of Deceiving Spirits. And by that means 
the most men, knowing their Duties will be less subject to serving the Ambitions of a 
few Discontented persons ...
For Hobbes the university is the only agency capable of channelling political ideas 
to society in a rational manner. Only in the university, where political sanity prevails, 
is his book safe from the prejudices of politics and religious demagoguery.
Frederick Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Inquiry, pp 15-39 (1982).
Id at p 49.
See John Scanlan, “Aliens in the Marketplace of Ideas,” p i532. Quoted by
Scanlan, Id at pp 1532-1533. The Marcusian argument answers in part Marxist ar­
guments that academic freedom is an ideology. I consider these Marxist arguments 
below.
Robert Maclver, Academic Freedom, in Our Time, p 11 (1955).
See Sweezy v New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, at pp 249-262 (1957); Keyishian v 
Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, at p 603 (1967); Group Universities Case [1973] 35 
BVerfGE 79 in Kommers, Constitutional Jurisprudence, 437, at p 442.
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, p 491 (Richard Tuck, ed., 1991).
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The university is a profoundly social institution and not a brooding omnipresence in 
the sky. University curricula are largely governed by material considerations 
constitutive of society’s needs. The university is composed of faculties of medicine, 
the physical and natural sciences, law etc. These utilitarian needs may change from 
time to time and are contingent on empirical circumstances.22 Nevertheless, the 
teaching of the curricula, research or study m ust be guided by public reason.23 The 
public service aspect of the university does not m ean society m ust have a say in how 
faculties should go about their tasks. Universities not only instil a  capacity for 
rational and independent judgem ent.24 They also educate and enable the individual 
to participate in the cultural, civil, political and economic affairs of her society. This 
promotes autonomy by fostering self respect.25
While one can analyse the benefits of academic freedom in the university from a 
utilitarian perspective, it is difficult to justify the right itself in the same terms. In the 
utilitarian view, “a right has reality, only when it is expressly asserted by authority 
of the state”, or when “whether through the agency of the state or when (whether 
through the agency of the state  or some other coherent group) it has positive force- 
or in the final resort, physical force to assert its claim.”26 Moreover, if academic 
freedom is solely justified on grounds of efficiency or the greatest happiness as the 
ultimate ends, this does not explain why its exercise can lead to great unhappiness.27 
Academic freedom cannot be granted and taken away depending on whether it serves 
some interest a t any particular moment. The raison de *etre of the right to academic 
freedom is freedom in scholarship and not welfare.
A utilitarian justification of academic freedom easily provides ammunition, to 
opponents of academic freedom. A powerful argum ent against academic freedom is 
that advanced by Marxists. They argue that : n  essence academic freedom and the 
university are in the service of capital. These are serious objections tha t w arrant a 
detailed elaboration and response.
We can concretise the idea by pointing to legal studies. Witness the decline in the 
popularity of legal formalism and positivism in American law, schools and the as­
cendancy of law economics and critical legal studies. Within the law schools there 
is always a healthy conflict between those who claim to train lawyers and those 
who claim to studying or teaching law.
On the social nature of university studies see, e.g. Immanuel Kant, The Conflict of 
the Faculties, (Mary J  Greggor, trans., 1992).
Peter Byrne “ Academic Freedom: A Special Concern,” pp 335-335.
See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p 101.
Russell Kirk, Academic Freedom: An Essay in Definition, pp 3-4 (1977).
Hardy E. Jones, “Academic Freedom as a Moral Right,” in The Concept of Academic 
Freedom p 45 (Edmund PincofTs, ed., 1975). This should not be taken as a 
denigrationof utilitarianism as an analytical tool. The argument is that academic 
freedom is not based on welfare or social utility, but its fruits can be analyzed from 
a utilitarian perspective. I have adopted this argument to answer ,in part, the 
claims of African leaders who claim we d o not need academic freedom for reasons of 
economic efficiency. However, the benefits outlined above would appear to far out­
weigh any justifications for interfering in the universities in the name of the public 
good.
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Marxist Objections To Academic Freedom
A thesis propounded by Bertell Oilman is that, academic freedom, serves capitalism, 
and that this is masked by tenuring some radical faculty. Without such faculty, what 
emerges from the universities would be seen as propaganda and not knowledge or 
science. Within the capitalist class itself, there is a conflict as who decides on the 
content of curricula, and, as to who will be tenured; the government, the adminis­
tration or faculty or capitalists in society. Academic freedom thus entails academic 
repression! As long as the capitalists control society and consequently the university, 
there will always remain a gap between its practice and ideal.28
Marx argued that the ruling ideas in every epoch are those of the materially dominant 
class.29 Gramsci develops a two pronged argument that expands on Marx’s insight. 
In State and Civil Society,30 he argues that the function of the capitalist state is to 
raise the great m ass of the population to a particular cultural and moral level that 
corresponds to the needs of the productive forces and thence the interests of the 
ruling class. The state  thus uses schools and universities to perform a positive 
educative function and the courts to perform the repressive and negative function. 
The capitalist class ideologically presents itself as capable of absorbing the entire 
society, culturally and economically, with the state taking the role of educator. 
Ideological hegemony, through the concept of separation of powers, is the tool for 
political control, while the repressive character of the state only emerges in times of 
crisis.31 Thus in the context of western democracies, the ideology of rights falsely 
presents the ruling class as the guardian of the interests and sentim ents of the 
ruled.32 The role of intellectuals is to ideologically prop the ruling class by giving it 
“homogeneity and consciousness” in the socio-economic and political spheres.33
Poulantzas, views intellectuals as state functionaries, who are enmeshed in power 
relations and who reproduce the capitalist system by maintaining the distinction 
between m anual and intellectual labour.34 An even more virulent attack comes from 
Milton Risk. He argues that academic freedom is an ideology designed to preserve 
capitalism in its destructive form, i.e. as imperialism.35
Marx, wanted to alleviate socio-economic inequality and its negative impact on equal 
access to mental and intellectual development. This is commendable and admirable. 
This concern can be easily resolved by free and equal access to education, which the 
state is required to secure. Consider here the universal nature of education and how 
societies the world over pursue it in some way or another.
Bertell Oilman, “Academic Freedom in America Today: A Marxist View,” (1983- 
19840 35 Monthly Review pp 30-41.
Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, The German Ideology, p 64 (1970).
Excepts in The Political Economy of Law: A Third World Reader, 201 (Yash Ghai et al 
eds., 1987).
Id at p 200.
Peter Beime, Richard Quiney, eds., Marxism and Law, p 279 (1982).
Antonio Gramsci, The Modem Prince and Other Writings, 118 (1957).
Nicos Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes, (Timothy O’Hagan trans., 
1976).
Milton Risk, “Academic Freedom in Class Society,” in The Concept of Academic Free­
dom, p 7 (Edmund R. PincofTs, ed., 1975).
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The university should not be seen a microcosm of the political or economic system, 
otherwise the whole issue of academic freedom collapses and the whole learning 
process would be nothing bu t ideology.36 For Marx, ideology denoted the false 
consciousness which the ruling classes impart to the m asses to perpetuate and m ask 
their oppression.37 There is, therefore, a contradiction in Marx. Once that false 
consciousness is unmasked, then what remains m ust be objective reality. This still 
leaves open the possibility of the pursuit of objective truth. Otherwise there would 
be no legitimate reasons for distinguishing academics from government bureau­
crats, or even Marx from the members of ruling class for tha t matter.
This, should not be construed to mean tru th  is pursued in a vacuum. The pursuit 
is not abstracted from social reality. The questions a researcher or a professor 
deliberates on, and the methodology used, can be determined by one’s social 
background.38 Nevertheless one has to be free in order to be objective. Science, for 
example, is not simply a m atter of laboratories and experimentation with appara­
tuses and hypotheses that support and ejcplain the results. Rather it is process of 
knowledge and as such, it presupposes independence from outside control.39 
Knowledge is not mere interest in a particular outcome, bu t rather objective and 
independent analysis in reaching the outcome. There is nothing wrong, for example, 
in requiring knowledge on religion, capitalism, Kant, Marx etc. But, it would be 
difficult to defend a system that requires a belief in any branch of knowledge as a 
condition to passing an examination or the award of a degree.
No doubt academic freedom does serve the good, bu t its binding nature as a right is 
not dependent upon the good. While research and scholarship can benefit welfare 
or certain elites in society, utilitarian gains are incidental to the nature and purpose 
of academic freedom. Our primary concern is the pursuit of tru th  as an  end in itself 
and the modus operandi of arriving at that particular result. Universities are not 
simply the stooges of power, even though power always attem pts to use them for its 
own ends.40
Moreover one has to be waiy of nihilism; a right encapsulated in bourgeois ideology 
is certainly better than no right at all.
Marx and Engels, The German Ideology.
Allen Fenichel, David Mandel, The Academic Corporation, Justice Freedom and the 
University, p  150 (1987).
See, John Ziman et al, The World of Science and the Rule of Law, p 13 (1986); “Fac­
tors and Conditions Conducive to Academic Freedom,” in Report of the Paris WUS/ 
UNESCO Seminar, 1 (1989).
For example in 1914 Harvard University rejected a $10 million bequest that was con­
ditional upon the dismissal of one radical professor. Another good example is that of a 
professor of Economics, Politics and History at Wisconsin University who was tried by 
a committee of the Regents for believing in “strikes and boycotts, justifying and en­
couraging the one while practising the other, “ and for promoting attacks on private 
property. Academics feared the worst, since the committee was composed of conserva­
tive lawyers and business people. To their surprise the board exonerated the professor 
and issued an authoritative statement that; “We cannot believe for a moment that 
knowledge has reached its final goal, or that the present society is perfect. We must 
therefore welcome from our teachers such discussions as shall suggest the means and 
prepare the way by which knowledge may be expanded, present evils be removed and 
others prevented. In all lines of academic investigation it is of the utmost importance 
that the investigator should be absolutely free to follow the indications of truth wher­
ever they may lead.” The two examples are reported by Walter P. Metzger, Academic 
Freedom in the Age of the University, 153, at p 184 (1955).
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The Idea of Academ ic Freedom
The concept of academic freedom is derived from what Kant calls public reason or 
intellectual freedom,41 an  idea to which we now turn. As free and purposive persons 
we are all committed to thinking and acting in accordance with thought. Reason has 
no dictatorial authority, its resolution, is simply an  agreement of free beings.42 In his 
essay, ‘W hat is Enlightenment?”, Kant contrasts between those who are unenlightened 
and acquiesce to others’ opinion and authority without question and those who are 
enlightened and speak publicly in their voice. This leads to the distinction between 
public and private reason.
When one uses public reason, he /she  addresses the entire public, even though it 
may end up only reaching “men of scholarship.” W hat am ounts to the use of public 
reason is not determined by the num ber of the audience. Rather, it is in .terms of the 
audience whom it is intended to reach. In contrast, private is what an  agent may 
make use of while in a relationship of command and obedience or while in the pursuit 
of self interest. For example public servants or soldiers or an  employee cannot 
exercise public reason because they are bound to obedience and the commands of 
superiors.43
The distinction between public and private reason can be exemplified as follows. A 
priest cannot criticise God a t the pulpit, because as a servant he is bound to 
obedience, bu t when writing as an  individual he can doubt the existence of God. In 
the first instance, he is acting on a commission from outside, and, in the second 
instance, he is writing of his own accord.44 Discussion which is not conditional on 
external coercion, even though it reaches only a small audience, constitutes public 
reason. W hat characterises public reason as intelligence without appetite is detach­
m ent and its accessibility to the world a t large. Even if few people understand the
The idea of public reason is introduced by Kant in an essay entitled, “An Answer to 
the Question: “What is Enlightenment," in Kant’ Political Writings, p 85 (Hans Reiss, 
ed. 1970). Reason when combined with the will denotes “the psychological faculties 
by which we pursue knowledge on one hand, and give consent on the other.” See 
Paul W. Kahn, “Community and. Contemporary Constitutional Law Theory,” (1989) 
99 Yale Law Journal p i .
Onora O’Neill, “Vindicating Reason,” in The Cambridge Companion to Kant, pp 291- 
293 (Paul Guyer ed., 1992).
See Id at p 298. This provides a clue as to why tenure and university autonomy are 
central to the idea of academic freedom and the university. A political conception of 
public reason is that detailed in John Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp 213-254 
(1993). Because Rawls’s discussion is political, he does not recognize the distinc­
tion between public and private reason. Rather the distinguishes, public and 
“nonpublic” reason. The former accounts for political democracy, while the latter 
explains the existence of universities or churches etc. The nonpublic reasons of 
each non- political institution differ depending on the nature and aim of the institu­
tion in question and conditions under which it pursues its ends. (Id at pp 220-221). 
Rawls does not however dwell on the issue of whether the individuals in such an in­
stitution require public reason in carrying out their tasks.
The example of the priest is suggested by Kant in “What is Enlightenment,” pp 56- 
59. See also Onora O’Neill, Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant’ Practical 
Philosophy, p 32 (1989).
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discussion in question, the important thing is that the issues can be debated without 
invoking the force of authority. Here authority refers to anything aside from reason 
itself, that tends to adversely influence the nature of the debate. Thus, communica­
tions between scholars “who are committed to reasoned inquiry is public.”45
People m ust be free to exercise their public reason because “freedom of the pen is the 
only safeguard for the rights of the people.”-6 This is not a shallow defence of freedom 
of opinion, bu t is an  idea that finds vindication in the application of public reason. 
It is the key to hum an liberation; without intellectual freedom, people are bound to 
obeying un just despotism. The maximal use of intellectual freedom requires general 
political freedom. For example, under a theocratic state, the uses of reason are not 
wholly public; they only become public when alien authority is replaced by tolerance. 
At a  political level, the failure to tolerate the use of public reason m arks a movement 
towards unjust polity, i.e. dictatorship. Where intolerance is practised, those whose 
thinking is silenced are not suppressed by reason, “bu t by authorities who lack 
reasoned vindication.”47 In contrast, in a state guided by the rule of law, where 
legality yields the greatest possible freedom realisable, the use of reason is wholly 
public.
Public reason, being a reflex of hum an agency, is not an abstract principle. Rather, 
it is a guiding principle of “thinking and doing in a dynamic process, that neither 
subm its to outside control, nor fails to recognise differences in opinion and 
practice.”48 Because hum an dignity and progress is dependent on intellectual 
freedom, a  contract limiting the use of one’s public reason is void ab initio.49 
Autonomy in thinking is the core of public reason and enlightenment. Autonomy 
involves not only self-assertion or independence, bu t thinking and acting freely and 
not blindly obeying authority.50 This presupposes tolerance.
Toleration is grounded in the idea of reason and conversely reason finds vindication 
in tolerance.51 Tolerance does not mean mere passive non-interference, but rather 
involves a response to a communication, i. e. it m ust point to a universal debate.52 Nor 
is it simply a political virtue, or a practice of ju s t polity. It is the only matrix within 
which a plurality of potentially reasoning beings can constitute the full authority of 
reason and so be able to debate without internal restrictions as to what a ju s t political 
constitution ought to be.53
45 O’Neill, Constmctions of Reason, p  34.
46 Immanuel Kant, “On the Common Saying: “This May Be True in Theory, But it Does 
not Apply in Practice,” in Kant’s Political Writings, 85.
47 O’Neill, Constructions of Reason, 39, at pp 48-50.
48 Id at p 301.
49 Kant, “What is Enlightenment,” p 57.
50 O’Neill, “Vindicating Reason,” p 299.
51 This theme runs through most of Kant’s major writings. See the works cited in 
Onora O’Neill, Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant’s Practical Philosophy, 
pp 28-29 (1989).
52 Id at pp 31-32.
Ibid, p 50.53
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Since public reason has no exogenous end except to be true to itself, it m ust involve 
and draw strength from reflection, debate, criticism and self criticism.54 According 
to Kant, the plurality of ideas creates the greatest possible unity. The diversity lies 
in the differences in opinion, while the unity lies in the search for a solution.55 So 
seen, public reason is preconceived in reason and articulated through reason.
Reason in general, and public reason in particular, precede politically instituted 
forms of tolerance; the former guides the latter. While Kant m aintains a  distinction 
between civil liberties and intellectual freedom,56 he recognises tha t “the use of public 
reason involves some outward action, and so needs some civil freedom.” The 
recognition is that intellectual freedom does not and is not limited to solitary 
reflection. One who reasons m ust address the entire reading public.57 This explains 
the symbiotic relationship between academic freedom and free speech. A society that 
is tolerant of free speech has high regard for public reason. It follows that intellectual 
freedom should ideally be conceived in a  politically tolerant society, for obedience 
without freedom is the cause of secret societies and conspiracy.58
The Idea of the University as an Exemplar of Public Reason
The epistemological foundation of the university lies in the conceptual structure of 
public reason itself. Possibility leads to actuality. The possibility of academic freedom 
(at the abstract level), exists everywhere bu t its practice depends on contingent 
empirical circumstances. Thought, cannot remain internal, it m ust practically verify 
itself, i.e. thought m ust achieve a determinate end. In the university, purposive 
activity is linked to an  end through thought; public reason and practical activity are
In several statements in his works, Kant argues that; “Reason must in all its 
undertakings subject itself to criticism; should it limit criticism by any prohibitions, 
it must harm itself, drawing upon itself damaging suspicion. Freedom in thinking 
means the subjection of reason under no other laws than that which it gives itself. 
Reason depends on this freedom for its very existence. For reason has no dictatorial 
authority; it is always simply the agreement of free citizens, of each one must be 
permitted to express, without let or hinderance, his objections or even his veto.” 
Quoted from O'Neill, Constructions of Reason, p 37.
O'Neill, “Vindicating Reason,” pp 286-287.
The political distinction is that ma:ntained by Mill, a distinction which is an integral 
part of On Liberty. Academic freedom as of necessity precedes the political and legal 
recognition of free speech or any political or civil rights for that matter. These rights 
must exist as constructs of thought before they become a construct of politics. 
These rights require Justification and they cannot be so Justified without intellec­
tual freedom.
O’Neill, Constructions of Reason, pp 32-33.
Kant, “On the Common Saying,’’ p 85. Mill makes the same observation; “A state of 
things in which a large portion of the most active and inquiring intellects find it 
advisable to keep the general principles and grounds of their convictions within 
their breasts, in what they address the public, to fit as much as they can of their 
own conclusions to premises which they have internally renounced, cannot send 
forth the open, fearless characters and logical consistent intellects...” See On Lib­
erty^ 94.
intrinsically conjoined.59 All reason is purposive arid thus pure thought m ust be 
translated into objective reality. Institutionally, this transformation may manifest 
itself in verbal discourse or constructions of riiatherriatical models and so on. 
Members of society are largely preoccupied with thought that carinot be generalised. 
They are concerned with private reason and causally, they are guided by utility, i.e. 
self interest. Thus, public reason requires an institution where the life of the mind 
can be actualised.
Byway of example, a priest can write a scholarly article doubting the existence of God 
but the nature of his job binds him to considerations of utility. Writing on atheism 
can result in undesirable personal and societal consequences leading to bias. It is 
best that this be discussed in an  institution that is distanced from society. Consider 
and reflect on the case of pornography. A reasonable person construed as a purposive 
agent would warit its restriction because it might, inter alia, promote undesirable 
passions. At the same time, he would accept that its study so that society can 
understand hum an desires, morals and the like.
The idea of the university brings potentially reasoning beirigs together to publicly 
discuss and pursue m atters concerning hum ankind. In a democracy, the function 
of the university becomes truly public. It stands between the citizeriiy, which is 
largely concerned with private interest and the state. The preoccupation with self 
interest can lead to acquiescence with unjust polity. < It therefore stands on the 
university to scrutinise political activity and the activities of the citizenry from the 
point of reason. Socialists, liberals, anarchists, nihilists and the like, fight it out from 
the point of reasoned argument. In the Hobbesian formulation, the university m ust 
stand above partisan views of what is good or right.60
Since the general public is largely preoccupied with private gain, it conceptually 
delegates its public reason to those in the university. Meiklejohn succinctly captures 
this idea when he remarks;
We who engage in research and teaching do so as agents of the people ...[W]e are 
commissioned to cany on for the people forms of intellectual activity, which 
belong to them, are done in their interest, but which in some specific forms, they 
cannot carry for themselves. Just as some men make shoes and other men g r o w  
food, so it is our business to discover truth in it’s more intellectualised forms and to 
make it powerful in the life of the community. And since we act as agents of the 
people, they grant us such of their freedom as is needed for that field of work.61
Those in the university argue on these m atters from the point of rationality, i.e. they 
reason. This is what politically vindicates the participation of intellectuals in public 
affairs. Understood this way, the university is not a conglomeration of physical 
structures. An assembly of scholars who periodically meet to publicly and freely 
articulate m atters of intellectual interest is still constitutive of a university. Centrifu- 
gally, this explains the nature of the university. If it is to exercise reason, it m ust be
See e.g. Ernest J  Weinrib, “Law as a Kantian Idea of Reason,” 87 Columbia Law 
Review 472, at p 482 (1987) (discussing purposive activity as an aspect of practical 
reason.)
Hobbes, Leviathanx p 491.
See e.g. Alexander Meiklejohn; Political Freedom, p  126.
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free of relations of command and obedience. Institutionally, public reason is reflected 
in the precepts of university autonomy, free expression and tenure to ensure that 
reason remains true to itself. These coefficients are unitary, i.e. they are constitutive 
of an integrated whole.
This whole, ensures that those want to exercise their reason publicly can criticise 
unjust laws and social practices and engage in what ever studies they consider worth 
studying, without being seen as treasonous or suffering reprisals. This conception 
does not deny public involvement in the affairs of the university. Rather, while the 
university presents itself as the model for society, it diametrically resists politicisation 
by.society, even if what goes on in the university may be political. Politicians, church 
authorities, or philanthropists cannot competently judge whether theories advanced 
by scholars are heresies or pernicious facts.62 Only scholars committed to rational 
inquiry are capable of passing such a judgement, because all other groups are largely 
influenced by considerations of utility.
The choice of subj ect, mode of analysis, publication of results whether written or oral 
all belong to the domain of academic freedom.63 The right assures scholars that their 
reasoned conclusions, even those in disagreement with society at large or their 
colleagues; will not be ground for reprisals from any quarter.64 Hence academic 
freedom is not
... thought of as a privilege, not as a concession, nor something that any authority 
inside or outside the institution may grant or deny, qualify or regulate according to its 
interest or discretion. It is something that is inherently bound up with the performance 
of the university’s task, something as necessary for the task as pen and paper, as 
classroom and students, as laboratories and libraries.65
Public needs should not translate into interference in the affairs of universities, 
because in the university knowledge is pursued as its own end and not merely as a 
means to an  end.66
Academic Freedom Distinguished From Free Speech
The previous discussion pointed to two things; that academic freedom as public 
reason differs from free speech and tha t nevertheless it is largely expressed through
Crosby Warren, “Academic Freedom,” in The American Concept of Academic Free­
dom in Formation, 691 (Walter P Metzger, ed., 1977).
Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, “Academic 
Freedom, Report on a Seminar on Academic Freedom*, p 9 (1992).
“Academic Freedom at the University of Stockholm,” 29 Minerva 330 (1991). 
Maclver, Academic Freedom in Our Time± p 11.
See Sweezy v New Hampshire 354 U.S. 234, at p 255 (1957). The concurring 
judgement of Justice Frankfurter is instructive.”A university ceases to be its own 
nature if it becomes a tool of Church or State or any sectional interest. A university 
is characterised by the spirit of free inquiry, its idea being the ideal of Socrates- “to 
follow the argument where it leads...”
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speech. The corruption of the term “academic freedom” to cover speech, especially 
political speech, has undesirable consequences. It implies universities are subject 
to the criteria of political parties, a view that is a t odds with the idea of public reason.67
Academic freedom’s distinctiveness from free speech is conceptual and not physical 
bu t nevertheless this distinction has practical cogency. This conceptual distinction 
lies in the criterion for justification and purpose. Those who profess to be academics 
do not ju s t talk, write or shout. They reason and justify and a t least attem pt to do 
so. Painting swastikas or shouting racial and sexist insults may well be free speech, 
bu t tha t has nothing to do with academic freedom. So conceived academic freedom 
is not an  empirical licence for making baseless claims or writings; it entails reasoned 
argument. Academic discourse is highly disciplined and formalist. The speaker uses 
reasoning rather than  demagogy to persuade his critical audience. Any deviance 
from accepted norms m ust be explained and or justified.68 Many types of expression 
are not allowed; “the physicist may not sing, the historian may not whine, the 
economist may not offer the primordial scream.”69 Sequentially and purposively, 
academic freedom is academic freedom and free speech is free speech.
The striking feature of academic freedom as an idea of public reason is its 
normativity. Academics everywhere are not only concerned with discourse or speech, 
bu t with reason. This explains why in the academic sphere, the world over, we.have 
standards of correctness and criteria of justification. Reason acknowledges certain 
common elements; “the concept of judgement, principles of inference, and rules of 
evidence, and m uch else, otherwise they would not be ways of reasoning but perhaps
Most Western liberal constitutions, for example the German and Japanese Consti­
tutions (Articles 5(3) and 33 respectively.) recognize academic freedom as a right 
distinct from free speech. In the United States, judicial practice created a separate 
constitutional right of academic freedom as a subset of the First Amendment. 
Sweezy v New Hampshire; Barrenblatt v United States 360 U.S. 109 (1959); 
Keyishianv Board of Regents. In contrast the court differentiates higher and lower 
education. Where school teachers or students are involved, the court has dealt with 
the matter speech grounds without reference to academic freedom. For example in 
Pickering v Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968). The matter of a school teacher 
who was dismissed for criticising the administration was dealt with wholly in terms 
of his position as a government employee. Or Tinker v Des Moines 393 U.S. 503 
(1969). The case of high school students who had worn armband to protest the Vi­
etnam war was resolved on speech grounds. For a discussion of this distinction, see 
Thomas I. Emerson, The System of Free Expression, pp 593-626 (1970). The Japa­
nese courts have adopted a similar approach. See Teruhisa Horio, Educational 
Thought and Ideology in Japan, 75-76 (1988).
J  Peter Byrne, " Academic Freedom: A ‘ Special Concern ‘ of the First Amendment,” 
(1989) 99 Yale Law Journal 254, pp 258-262.
Id at p 258.69
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rhetoric or means of persuasion.”70 In pari ratione academic freedom as public reason 
involves the willing of thought that is generalisable, while free speech involves the 
willing of thought that is private.
Relevance, as the criterion for justification, is an  important signpost tha t marks 
academic discourse from other forms of expression. The very idea of academic 
discourse denies the relevance of race to a discussion on the quantum  theory or the 
discussion of how nuclear particles react in an  essay on principles of contract for 
example. With, say, a political science class, different considerations may apply. 
There are legitimate reasons for learning the nature of hate groups in  the political 
process. •
In short, reason sets its own limits. A history professor who writes a book arguing 
that the holocaust or slavery is a fiction is a valid ground for dismissing him for 
incompetence because all reasonable academics know this to be factually false. This 
is different from arguing tha t the holocaust or slavery were good. The later is a 
statement of opinion and not of fact; Conversely, an  engineering professor can write 
a book doubting slavery or the holocaust.71 But he can’t rely on academic freedom 
in doing so. Only free speech, so understood, allows him to do so. This does not m ean 
an engineering professor is not protected by academic freedom when writing what 
reasonable historians accept as scholarly. An academic has no obligation to confine 
his analysis to a  chosen field. The world would have suffered a great loss had Kant 
remained, a physicist and had been forbidden to tu rn  his attention to law and 
philosophy.72
Some legal commentators having failed to grasp the normative foundation of 
academic freedom in public reason argue for its replacement by rights in the 
workplace.73 While it is tempting to see academic freedom as an aspect of employ­
ment, academic freedom is not an incident of employment. Workers in a  can factory 
are answerable to the owner and yet academics are answerable to themselves. Put 
differently, workers are in  a  relationship of command and obedience. Academics can 
still have workers’ rights, bu t without academic freedom, a university ceases to of its 
own nature. A useful analogy is the judiciary. It would be the height of naivety to 
argue tha t judicial tenure is about workplace rights. While workers have free speech 
in the workplace, such speech Certainly does not extend to public criticism of
Rawls, Political Liberalism, p 220. Thus in Kleindienst v Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, at p 
765 (1972), the Court rejected the state’s argument that U.S. academics did not re­
quire the physical presence of a communist academic because his presence could 
be supplanted by modem telecommunications resources like telephone hook ups. It 
found that in academic debate, face to face argument was central, just as in the 
courts the submission of written briefs does not dispense with oral argument.
See eg David M. Rabban, “A Functional Analysis of “Individual” and “Institutional” 
Academic Freedom Under the First Amendment,” (1990) 53 Law and Contemporary 
Problems 227, at p 242 .
See e.g. Machlup, “Some Misconceptions,” p 194.
Robert F. Ladenson, “Is Academic Freedom Necessary?,” (1985) 5 Philosophy and 
Law 59, at pp 77- 87 .
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employers, customers, sponsors or patrons, nor do companies go out of their way to 
hire people who are critical of the principal shareholder.
Conclusion
The inexorable conclusion is tha t the idea G f academic freedom is inherent in human 
reason. The concept of academic freedom is not peculiar to liberalism. Nor is it 
incompatible with socialist democracy, theocracy or any other mode of social 
governance. Can anyone point to a  society tha t has laid down a dogma and found no 
one to challenge it? What differs is the conception and practice of the concept. This 
is largely dependent on the justness of the prevailing political order. The picture I 
have painted indicates tha t the liberal conception of academic freedom comes 
nearest to the realisation of the concept.
The university simply mirrors the application of public reason a t the theoretical and 
practical level. Scholarship, so called is not about playing court to authority, or 
advancing certain interests, or friendship or placating foes. It should principally 
involve vindicating one’s position from a. reasoned argument. Philosophically, 
academic freedom is the sum  total of conditions and precepts that make possible the 
practical realisation of public reason. Juridically, it involves drawing out the 
practical implications of public reason. To conclude, academic freedom is the legal 
right you and I have individually as student and teacher and collectively as an  
institution by the dictates of our calling. The right is anterior to its outcomes or to 
the state. It is owed to you and I by virtue of being persons engaged in the academic 
enterprise. From the point of utility, the guiding maxim is tha t if you want 
universities to serve the public good, make them repositories of public reason and 
then and thereby conjoin the freedom of scholars with the legitimate and rational 
needs of society.
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